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During the second half of the 19th century, the psychology of language was
invented as a discipline for the sole purpose of explaining the evolution of
spoken language. These efforts culminated in Wilhelm Wundt’s monumental
Die Sprache of 1900, which outlined the psychological mechanisms involved
in producing utterances and considered how these mechanisms could have
evolved. Wundt assumes that articulatory movements were originally rather
arbitrary concomitants of larger, meaningful expressive bodily gestures. The
sounds such articulations happened to produce slowly acquired the meaning
of the gesture as a whole, ultimately making the gesture superfluous. Over a
century later, gestural theories of language origins still abound. I argue that
such theories are unlikely and wasteful, given the biological, neurological
and genetic evidence.
Psychology and the genesis of language
The evolution or genesis of spoken language has always been a core concern for
students of the psychology of language, or psycholinguists as they have been
calling themselves since the 1960s. In fact, the psychology of language was
invented by linguists to account for the evolution of language. Levelt1 described
this state of affairs as follows:
When, after the period of Idealism, logic lost its ground as a basis for the
understanding of grammar, linguists began to view language as a spontaneous
product of nature. Language is a natural product of consciousness, according to
leading nineteenth century linguists such as Herder, Steinthal, and Lazarus. The
great challenge for such linguistics was to explain the origin, structure and variety
of languages as arising from an ‘Ursprache’, spontaneously generated by human
awakening consciousness. That romantic, evolutionary perspective shifted the
weight of explanation in linguistics to psychology. ‘Glu¨ckliche Fortschritte in
der Sprachwissenschaft setzen eine entwickelte Psychologie voraus’ (Fortunate
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advances in linguistics presuppose a developed psychology), wrote Heymann
Steinthal in 1855.2
Knoblauch,3 in his thorough account of this early history, shows that,
regrettably, such a ‘developed psychology’ simply didn’t exist. Steinthal had little
else than Herbart’s atomistic individual psychology to refer to, and the occasional
self-proclaimed psychologist of his time was not interested in this kind of
challenge. In other words, the ‘psychology of language’ was invented by linguists
pour le besoin de la cause – it was little else than linguistic folk psychology.
But matters changed when Wilhelm Wundt took up the challenge, beginning
in the 1880s and eventually resulting in his two-volume Die Sprache of 1900.4
For Wundt too, the principal aim was to explain spoken language and languages
as a spontaneous product of consciousness, as an expression of mind. The ultimate
linguistic explanandum was the phylogenesis of language and Wundt set out to
create a theory of microgenesis, the generation of words and sentences in the
individual mind, to provide the theoretical foundation. Modern psychology of
language began with a theory of ‘speaking’. The deep motivation for that theory
was to provide the psychological foundations for an explanation of the
evolutionary origins of language.
Historically speaking, therefore, the psycholinguist’s primary ‘window on
language genesis’ was the microgenesis of utterances in the speaker’s mind. This
window has not lost any of its relevance since Wundt’s time, but it certainly
deserves more attention next to the other psycholinguistic perspectives, the
genesis of language in the child’s mind and the online genesis of interpretation
(intention recognition) in the listener’s mind. The generation of utterances, i.e. the
act of speaking, psychologically involves several levels of processing, which
operate in parallel and with relative autonomy.5,6 At the primary, conceptual level
the speaker retrieves and unfolds information whose expression can effectively
transmit some communicative intention to an interlocutor. For Wundt, this gradual
mental unfolding of predications is a centrepiece of his theory. It is his major effort
to explain the online generation of syntax from a semantic/conceptual base. Here
he was the first to use phrase structure diagrams as we still do today, a notion he
himself introduced in linguistics.7 From the evolutionary point of view, this
successive attentional focusing on the whole idea (Gesamtvorstellung) and
gradually on its constituents and sub-constituents in their mutual relations (which
Wundt called ‘apperception’) must have been an ability essential to the genesis
of language. When brain damage limits this attentional apperceptive span, the
generation of complex utterances is indeed severely limited.8 The mental
unfolding of simple predications (though hardly in syntactic patterns) is most
likely within a chimpanzee’s abilities.9 A core issue for any theory of language
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origins is how early humans developed a spoken medium for communicating their
intentions.
This spoken medium corresponds to another level of processing in the speaker.
Speakers generate overtly articulated utterances, consisting of words and phrases
that systematically express the intended information. An ultimate step here is to
prepare a ‘syllabification’ over successive words. This syllabification is indeed
a rather autonomous process, which, in many languages, easily ignores the
integrity of successive words (as for instance in he’ll-bur-nit for ‘he will burn it’).
The speaker’s incremental encoding of the utterance’s articulatory shape is a
process of high complexity and impressive speed.10 Among primates this is unique
to Homo sapiens and hence a particular challenge to any theory of language
genesis. It has always amazed me that, since Wundt and even earlier, the dominant
response to this challenge has been to ignore it and to argue that language evolved
in a gestural mode.
Gestural origins of language – a persistent misconception
Let us consider, as a typical early example of such reasoning, Wilhelm Wundt’s
grand tour-de-force. It was to explain the phylogeny of language from a universal,
original sign language. The temptation was, admittedly, irresistible. Spoken
languages are all different, the apparent outcome of an extensive cultural
evolution. But sign language was still one and undivided. Wundt’s informants had
convinced him (counterfactually as we now know) that all deaf communities
essentially use the same, primitive gesturing system for communication. A
universal fallback system, not a full language, but one that can serve in basic,
pragmatic communication. This universality of sign language cannot be an
accident, Wundt must have thought; it must have been at the origin of language.
This was certainly not an original idea. In his 1644 book, Bulwer11 called
gesturing the ‘onlely speech that is naturall to Man’. He had many followers,
among them Jean-Jacques Rousseau.12 In fact, the idea of a gestural origin of
language has been kept alive to the present day. Prominent recent examples are
Corballis13 and Arbib.14 I keep being surprised by this need to use gesture as a
deus ex machina for the explanation of spoken language genesis. Occam’s razor
can be very helpful in clearing the air.
First, assume you have explained the evolution of a gestural language. The next
step to take is the explanation of spoken language genesis. This will, among other
things involve the complete knocking out of a specialized manual articulatory
system and the creation of a vocal articulatory system with its phonological base.
It is like building a car by first building a ship and then removing the sail, putting
it on wheels and adding a combustion engine. This is the recurring unsolved
problem for the gesturalists. Wilhelm Wundt tells us about articulatory gestures
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as expressive movements, which are part of the larger, meaningful bodily gesture.
They are not there to produce any specific sound; rather the sound is just a
consequence of this articulatory component of the gesture as a whole. As a
consequence, the speech sound has only an indirect relation to the meaning
expressed in the total gesture, etc, etc. But the real work to be done in such a
theoretical framework is to explain causally the construction of a spoken,
self-sufficient and quite arbitrary lexicon from the primitive, pre-existing
meaningful gestural lexicon. Since that work, i.e. explaining the genesis of a
spoken vocabulary, will have to be done anyhow, why do it twice, first building
a flexible gestural lexicon, then building a totally different vocal lexicon? Modern
gesturalists, just like Wundt, neither explain why the once universally available,
communicatively entirely useful gestural languages fell into equally universal
disuse, nor do they take up McNeillage’s15 challenge of presenting a detailed
account of the ultimate evolution of speech, as if that final step comes for free.
Rather they keep arguing that signing is our more primitive, original form of
communication. McNeill,16 in discussing Goldin-Meadow’s17 discovery of
spontaneous development of a gestural communication system among deaf
children, concludes as follows: ‘It is consistent with the theory that vocal speech
overlies an ability of manual communication. When vocal speech is blocked the
original system remains’. This, I have argued,18 is a non-sequitur. It is equally
consistent with other theories, notably the one that claims that if the vocal-auditory
channel is blocked, the most flexible alternative will be used for linguistic
communication.
Second, the selective advantage of a gestural language is unconvincing. Such
a language is functionally dead during, on average, 12 hours a day. It is of little
use for gatherers in bushy areas, as our ancestors were. It heavily interferes with
tool use, harvesting, cooking and other important daily routines that involve the
use of hands. Not a practical system at all.
Third, and most important, Homo sapiens had a biological endowment that
provided enormous advantage over all other primates: it had cortical control over
vocalization. This important argument is usually ignored in the current literature.
The classical work by Ploog19,20 and Ju¨rgens21,22 has shown that there are two
systems in our brains that control vocal behaviour. The old system, which we share
with all other primates and land-living vertebrates, comprises limbic structures,
all of which funnel into the peri-aquaductal grey of the midbrain. It allows for
emotional vocalization, a repertoire of vocal signals relating to specific
motivational states. But it lacks cortical control. The second, new system, is the
neocortical voice pathway as part of the pyramidal tract. It began to emerge in
primates but became qualitatively different in Homo sapiens. It provided man with
full voluntary control of the voice and of articulation. This speech system kept
working in tandem with the old ‘emotional’ system, which created the wonderful
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ability to express voluntarily a wide spectrum of emotional states by using the
voice. This is not yet language, of course. The argument, rather, is that this second
system must have provided us, as social animals, with substantial selective
advantage.
The recent discovery of a FOXP2 gene with a specifically human mutation23
adds to this argument in the following way. The gene is a transcription factor
which, among many others, affects genes responsible for the development of
pathways involved in the control of fine orofacial movements, including fine
articulation. The authors argue that the mutation became widespread some
200,000 years ago or shortly after, i.e. when modern humans emerged; the genetic
evidence suggests that this occurred under selective pressure. In other words, our
ancestors had high stakes in the voluntary control of precise articulation.
Apparently, speech, rather than gesture, became the chosen medium for linguistic
communication in early Homo sapiens.
These and other arguments should focus our attention on where the biological
action really is, namely in linking a conceptual/semantic system to the
vocal-auditory communicative domain. In ontogeny these two systems initially
develop quite independently, involving different regions in the maturing brain.
During the babbling phase, from the seventh month onwards, there is sudden
maturation of basic syllabic gestures, such as gi-gi and da-da. These babbles are
entirely meaningless. This articulatory maturation is achieved through continuous
audio-motor feedback, but without reward for correct imitation (this is in strong
contrast with Wundt’s4 claim that first articulations are pure imitations). Only by
the end of the first year, does this syllabic repertoire get tuned to the target
language.1 This is during the period that the infant starts recognizing often
recurring words in the speech stream.22 For the child these words are initially as
meaningless as his own babbles. But the child now has the capacity to generate
a set of possible words or proto-words. It is still a long way (a few years for the
child) to develop this phonological system in full detail and to link such possible
words to a system of meanings; it is an even longer route to enrich them with
syntactic properties, but the balls to play with are all there.1 Similarly, these balls
were there for our ancestors. These are the biological endowments we should
consider head-on when we meditate about the early evolution of language.
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